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An Important Time for the Future of Class 
Action Waivers and the Power Struggle 
Between Businesses and Consumers 
Jack Downing* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, arbitration in the United States has been used and 
enforced as a mechanism to facilitate quick and inexpensive resolutions to 
disputes.  Contracts with arbitration clauses allow the signatories to quickly 
arbitrate disputes from the outset of their agreement.  Binding arbitration will 
result in a decision, to which each of the parties must adhere.1  Arbitrated 
disputes, in their purest form, can bring about fair and unbiased decisions not 
only more quickly, but also at a fraction of the cost of taking the same dispute 
through the litigation process.2 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA” or “Act”) was enacted in 1925 in 
response to courts’ unfavorable treatment of arbitration agreements.3  Among 
many provisions protecting the enforceability of such agreements, § 2 of the 
FAA provides that “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration . . . shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”4  Over the years, this provi-
sion has been the subject of debate in numerous courts throughout the United 
States, including, on many occasions, the Supreme Court of the United 
States.5 
Specifically, this Note examines the modern application of this section 
of the FAA and how recent developments regarding agreements to arbitrate 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  This 
Note is written with much appreciation to Dean Robert G. Bailey for guidance and the 
Missouri Law Review editorial board for assistance. 
 1. What Is Binding Arbitration?, LAW DICTIONARY, 
http://thelawdictionary.org/binding-arbitration/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 2. See Asa Lopatin, What Constitutes Arbitration for Federal Arbitration Act 
Purposes?, ABA (June 16, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles/spring2014-0614-
federal-arbitration-act.html. 
 3. See id. 
 4. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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have impacted the overall fairness of arbitration proceedings.  In the consum-
er setting, courts have not heavily weighed the bargaining power imbalance 
that often accompanies these agreements.6  Instead, the Supreme Court has 
sought to protect individuals’ rights and their ability to contract freely,7 but in 
doing so, the Court has ignored detrimental public policy implications.  Per-
haps most notably, the Supreme Court has recently declared that the FAA 
will preempt any state law finding that class action waiver clauses in contrac-
tual agreements are invalid.8  Pursuant to these types of clauses, the bargain-
ing parties agree to forego any ability to bring a class action claim arising out 
of the contract.9  This means each claim must be resolved “bilaterally.”10  The 
implications of such a waiver are extraordinary. 
Now has come an important time for the future of class action waivers.  
Recently, legislation was proposed in Congress to protect consumers from 
entering into class action waiver agreements unfavorable to them,11 but with a 
lack of bipartisan support, it may be difficult to enact such legislation.  A 
remedy more likely to protect consumers will come from various regulatory 
agencies.  Many of these agencies have the power to prohibit class action 
waivers in contracts where one party has superior bargaining power.12  Agen-
cies such as the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) have already 
begun proposing rules that would limit the use of these waivers.13 
This Note discusses the inherent problems that come with arbitration 
clauses in contracts of adhesion.  Further, this Note will address the likeli-
hood of a potential change – through future Supreme Court interpretations of 
the FAA or new legislation.  Something must be done to protect those with 
inferior bargaining power from being forced, through contracts of adhesion, 
to give up their right to bring class action lawsuits.  If Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and regulatory agencies maintain the status quo, companies will retain 
 
 6. These contracts in which one party has superior bargaining power are often 
referred to as contracts of adhesion.  Cornell Univ. Law School, Adhesion Contract 
(Contract of Adhesion), LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_contract_of_adhesion (last visit-
ed Jan. 11, 2017). 
 7. See generally DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 464–65 (2015). 
 8. See id. at 468. 
 9. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337. 
 10. See id. at 348.  In this context, “bilaterally” means that each claimant will 
bring his or her case individually.  See id. at 348–50. 
 11. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act, S. 2506, 114th 
Cong. (2016). 
 12. CFPB Considers Proposal to Ban Arbitration Clauses That Allow Compa-
nies to Avoid Accountability to Their Customers, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-considers-
proposal-to-ban-arbitration-clauses-that-allow-companies-to-avoid-accountability-to-
their-customers/ [hereinafter CFPB Press Release]. 
 13. See id.  See also Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 
24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
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the ability to improperly strip consumers of their rights and their due com-
pensation nationwide. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the FAA was enacted to overcome ju-
dicial hostility toward arbitration agreements.14  On many occasions prior to 
the FAA’s enactment in 1925, courts refused to order specific performance of 
arbitration agreements.15  By enacting the FAA, Congress indicated its belief 
that arbitration was a viable alternative to litigation as a legitimate means of 
dispute resolution.16  With the Act, Congress wanted to ensure that arbitration 
agreements would be enforced like other contracts.17  In interpreting Con-
gress’s intent, the Supreme Court has recognized “the desirability of arbitra-
tion as an alternative to the complications of litigation.”18  Additionally, the 
Court has cited efficiency and expediency as benefits resulting from arbitra-
tion proceedings.19  Section 2, a provision that protects arbitration clauses and 
puts them on equal ground with other contractual agreements, states: 
[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or 
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controver-
sy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.20 
This section is considered a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to 
the contrary.”21  However, this section, and its application to class action 
waiver clauses, is a subject of major dispute between the state and federal 
courts. 
 
 14. See generally Lopatin, supra note 3. 
 15. See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codi-
fied as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)). 
 16. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 17. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974). 
 18. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas 
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 19. See generally Scherk, 417 U.S. 506. 
 20. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 21. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983) (emphasis added). 
3
Downing: An Important Time
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1154 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
A.  History of Class Arbitration Before Concepcion 
Issues regarding class arbitration are relatively new, with the first deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the matter coming 
in 2003 with Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.22  There, the Court was 
presented with the issue of whether the FAA prohibits companies from at-
taching class arbitration waivers to their contracts.23  Before deciding that 
issue, the Supreme Court had to determine the preliminary issue of whether 
the contract in question forbid class arbitration.24  To this point, the Court 
held: “The question – whether the agreement forbids class arbitration – is for 
the arbitrator to decide.”25  The next logical question was what would the 
Supreme Court decide on appeal when an arbitrator does make a ruling on the 
issue.26 
In 2010, the Supreme Court addressed this question in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.27  In Stolt-Nielsen, the panel of arbitra-
tors based its decision on “post-Bazzle arbitral decisions” that allowed for 
class arbitration in a wide variety of settings – in this instance, antitrust.28  
The arbitrators believed, since the contract was silent on the issue of class 
arbitration, there existed “[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action 
arbitration.”29  The Court, however, disagreed, holding that “class-action arbi-
tration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be 
presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their dis-
putes to an arbitrator.”30  It discussed the “consensual” nature of arbitration 
and found that if the parties did not expressly agree to permit class proceed-
ings, there was no implicit agreement.31  In essence, this meant that the de-
fault rule, in every contract silent on the issue of class arbitration, was that a 
party may not bring a class arbitration proceeding – only a bilateral arbitra-
tion.32  Following Stolt-Nielsen, one question remained: what happens when a 
contract calls for an express waiver of class arbitration proceedings? 
 
 22. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 23. Id. at 451. 
 24. Id. at 450. 
 25. Id. at 451. 
 26. The court in Bazzle did not address this question. 
 27. 559 U.S. 662, 669–70 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 673. 
 29. Id. at 685. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 687. 
 32. Id. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/16
2016] CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 1155 
B.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the Enforcement of Class 
Arbitration Waiver Agreements 
Regarding express waivers of class arbitration proceedings, the Supreme 
Court handed down a landmark decision in 2011, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion.33  The facts of the case are relatively simple: the Concepcions 
brought the case as a putative class action to recover the amount of the sales 
tax paid on AT&T phones that had been advertised as free.34  The Court 
granted certiorari after the Supreme Court of California held that the class 
arbitration waiver provision was “unconscionable because it disallowed class-
wide proceedings.”35  The Supreme Court of California applied its Discover 
Bank rule, which declared a class action waiver provision unconscionable 
when: (1) the waiver is “found in a consumer contract of adhesion,” (2) the 
class action would involve a “predictably” small amount of money, and (3) it 
is alleged that the party with “superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”36 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia invalidated each of these three 
elements of the Discover Bank rule and dismissed them as non-legitimate 
requirements to find unconscionability in the contract.37  According to the 
Supreme Court, “When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a partic-
ular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is dis-
placed by the FAA.”38  Moreover, when state law “stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress,” federal law will preempt it.39  Pursuant to this rule, a five-four 
Supreme Court majority held that the FAA preempted California’s Discover 
Bank rule.40  In support of this conclusion, the Court offered a variety of dif-
ferent reasons for why class arbitration was impractical and contrary to Con-
gress’s intent when creating the FAA. 41 
First, the majority determined that “the switch from bilateral to class ar-
bitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration – its informality – 
and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate pro-
cedural morass than final judgment.”42  The court offered several statistics to  
 33. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011). 
 34. Id. at 327 (the sales tax charge to the plaintiff was $32.22). 
 35. Id. at 333.  A contractual provision is unconscionable when it is so unfair that 
no ordinary, informed person would agree to it.  Unconscionable, LAW.COM, 
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2183 (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 36. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 
2005) abrogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333. 
 37. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351–52. 
 38. Id. at 341 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). 
 39. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 40. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. 
 41. Id. at 348–52. 
 42. Id. at 348. 
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prove this point.43  According to the opinion, the median time from the filing 
of a class arbitration dispute to its settlement was 583 days – much longer 
than the median time for bilateral arbitrations.44 
Second, the majority discussed the notion that class arbitration required 
“procedural formality.”45  The majority pointed out that the American Arbi-
tration Association’s (“AAA”) rules for class certification parallel those of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).46  This causes complications, 
as many arbitrators are not familiar with the rules for class certification and 
may make determinations based solely on policy.47  The majority held: “We 
find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposi-
tion of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator.”48 
Third, the majority felt that arbitration, lacking in appellate review, “is 
poorly suited to the higher stakes of litigation.”49  It cited a more favorable 
appeals process in litigation and less room for error.50  Justice Breyer’s dis-
sent51 hotly contested each of these three points. 
First, he believed the majority’s comparison between class and bilateral 
arbitration to be improper.52  He stated, “The relevant comparison is not ‘ar-
bitration with arbitration’ but a comparison between class arbitration and 
judicial class actions.”53  Comparing these two, Justice Breyer found that 
class arbitrations are faster than judicial class actions,54 undermining the un-
derlying public policy argument of the majority.  Instead of hindering the 
expeditiousness of dispute resolution, class arbitration actually acted in fur-
therance of it, Justice Breyer argued.55  Regarding the second point, Justice 
Breyer contended that the guidelines set forth by the AAA are more than suf-
ficient to allow arbitrators to make a determination regarding the appropriate-
ness of certifying a given class.56  Lastly, Justice Breyer pointed out that “the 
majority provides no convincing reason to believe that parties are unwilling 
to submit High-Stake disputes to Arbitration” and went on to cite numerous 
scenarios where the parties did submit “High-Stake” disputes.57 
 
 43. Id. at 348–49. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 349. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 
(2010). 
 48. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349. 
 49. Id. at 350.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (he was joined by Justices Ginsburg, So-
tomayor, and Kagan). 
 52. Id. at 363. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 362. 
 57. Id. at 363. 
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Ultimately, the majority found that California’s Discover Bank rule was 
contrary to the intent of Congress and, therefore, preempted by the FAA.58  
Although each individual point was disputed by the dissent, there was one 
main overarching public policy reason for which he dissented: the holding in 
Concepcion shields companies from liability arising from their manipulation 
of consumer contracts in a way that deliberately cheats consumers out of 
small amounts of money.59  In Justice Breyer’s words, Discover Bank 
acknowledges situations where “consumer contracts can be manipulated to 
insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds by ‘deliberate-
ly cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money,’” and the implementation of a rule prohibiting such conduct should 
be “California’s to make.”60 
Since plaintiffs and attorneys have little incentive to pursue any form of 
dispute resolution to recover small amounts of money, they will rarely bring 
individual claims.61  For this reason, companies have the ability to cheat their 
customers out of small amounts of money, knowing each of them individual-
ly will fail to file a claim subject to arbitration.62  When multiplied by mil-
lions of customers, these small amounts of money will produce substantial 
profit for the companies at the expense of consumers.63  The result from Con-
cepcion is contrary to sound public policy, and since the decision in 2011, 
many courts around the country have done all they can to limit its effect.64 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the post-Concepcion world, lawyers and courts alike have been craft-
ing arguments and opinions that allow courts to find class arbitration waivers 
invalid in spite of the holding in Concepcion.65  In Missouri, as well as other 
states, the highest courts have issued opinions that push the limits delineated 
by Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion in order to address the underlying policy 
considerations.66  However, courts can only stretch their decisions so far be-
fore having to recognize the binding authority set forth by Concepcion.  With 
this in mind, a more effective solution would be to enact legislation prohibit-
 
 58. Id. at 352 (majority opinion). 
 59. Id. at 365–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 365–66 (alteration in original) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
 61. Id. at 347, 351 n.8 (majority opinion). 
 62. See generally id. at 351–52. 
 63. Id. at 365–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 64. See Wallace v. Red Bull Distrib. Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822 (N.D. Ohio 
2013); Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 128 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 330, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 65. See Orman v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7086 DAB, 2012 WL 4039850, at 
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012). 
 66. See Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492–96 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc). 
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ing the use of class action waivers in contracts of adhesion.  Until this hap-
pens, courts will continue to find ways to limit the scope of Concepcion. 
A.  Finding a Way Around Concepcion 
In Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, the Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that a class arbitration waiver in certain situations is unconscionable and un-
enforceable.67  The court applied Concepcion to find “that the presence and 
enforcement of the class arbitration waiver does not make the arbitration 
clause unconscionable.”68  This was another case involving many individual-
ly small damage amounts that, when combined, would amount to a large 
profit for Missouri Title Loans.69  The loan company contended “that all state 
law unconscionability defenses are preempted by the [FAA] in all cases,” 
pursuant to the holding in Concepcion.70  In response to this argument, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri made several points, creating an avenue around 
the authoritative holding in Concepcion.71 
First, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that “the expressly stated is-
sue in Concepcion was whether California’s Discover Bank rule was 
preempted, not whether all state law unconscionability defenses are preempt-
ed.”72  The court cited the unique criteria laid out in the Discover Bank rule 
and determined that the contract laws of other states are sufficiently different 
from the Discover Bank rule.73  It therefore deduced: 
Not all state law contract defenses require class wide arbitration to the 
detriment of both the defendant and the plaintiff consumer.  Accord-
ingly, consistent with the stated issue in Concepcion, the Supreme 
Court’s holding was expressly limited to finding that [the FAA 
preempts only California’s Discover Bank rule].74 
Effectively, the court determined that a case-by-case analysis of the 
FAA’s preemption over state contract law would be necessary moving for-
ward.75 
Second, the Supreme Court of Missouri found: “Holding that the § 2 
saving clause preempts all state law unconscionability defenses would be 
inconsistent with both the saving clause and the [Supreme Court] majority’s 
express recognition of unconscionability as one of the generally applicable 
 
 67. See id. at 493. 
 68. Id. at 487. 
 69. Id. at 486. 
 70. Id. at 490. 
 71. Id. at 486. 
 72. Id. at 490. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 491. 
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contract defenses that retains vitality under the § 2 saving clause.”76  Again, 
the court stressed that every case is different and concluded that it was not 
Congress’s intent to create a federal law that deliberately preempted all state 
contract law unconscionability defenses.77 
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that because the majority 
in Concepcion engaged in a drawn-out analysis of unconscionability, it could 
not have possibly intended to hold that the FAA preempts all state law uncon-
scionability defenses per se.78  In essence, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
thought the Court in Concepcion made a determination based on the facts of 
the case.79  Thus, because state contract laws are different in each state – par-
ticularly, the unconscionability defense requirements – and because the facts 
of each case are different, all cases regarding class arbitration waiver clauses 
must be examined on a case-by-case basis.80 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Missouri used these points to maneu-
ver around Concepcion.  After applying Missouri contract law regarding un-
conscionability, the court held that the class arbitration provision was uncon-
scionable because the arbitration agreement as a whole was unconscionable 
based on its terms.81 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Response to State Efforts to Limit the Scope 
of Concepcion 
In 2015, another California case, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, analyzed 
the FAA’s preemption of state laws regarding class arbitration waivers.82  
The agreement in this case specified that the entire arbitration clause was not 
enforceable if the “law of your state” declared class arbitration waivers unen-
forceable.83  Before the case was brought to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the Supreme Court of California determined that since parties are free 
to contract as they wish, and since the contract applied California state law, 
the contract referred to the existing California law “as it would have been 
absent federal pre-emption.”84  According to this finding, the Supreme Court 
of California held the class arbitration provision invalid under state law be-
cause such a provision was unconscionable.85  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of the United States granted certiorari.86 
 
 76. Id. at 490. 
 77. Id. at 490–91. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 492. 
 80. Id. at 490. 
 81. Id. at 496. 
 82. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 468–69 (2015). 
 83. Id. at 468. 
 84. Id. at 464. 
 85. Id. at 466, 472. 
 86. Id. at 467–68. 
9
Downing: An Important Time
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1160 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
In reversing the Supreme Court of California, the Court offered a variety 
of arguments.87  In the majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court 
first noted that its decisions were binding on the lower courts.88  This served 
as a scathing reminder to the Supreme Court of California to recognize bind-
ing authority.  It seemed Justice Breyer recognized that California, and many 
other state courts, were trying to evade the holding in Concepcion.  He re-
ferred the California court to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
“[T]he Supremacy Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from 
federal law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize 
the superior authority of its source.”89 
With regard to the state law at issue in DIRECTV, the Court held: “Ab-
sent any indication in the contract that this language is meant to refer to inva-
lid state law, it presumably takes its ordinary meaning: valid state law.”90  
The Court defined valid state law to be state law that is not preempted by 
federal law, and since the FAA preempts state law with regard to class arbi-
tration waivers, the state law applied in this case was determined to be inva-
lid.91  Thus, the Supreme Court nullified the efforts of the Supreme Court of 
California, and, in doing so, thwarted its effort to get around the Concepcion 
holding.92 
In the post-Concepcion world, many other state courts have struggled to 
accept the policy outcome of Concepcion.93  The Concepcion holding created 
a loophole that allows companies with superior bargaining power to impose 
small expenses on individuals and exculpate themselves from potential liabil-
ity through contracts of adhesion.94  Traditional state law contract defenses, 
such as unconscionability, would not work when applied directly to the class 
arbitration provisions, regardless of the merits of the defense.95  The Supreme 
Court effectively made a preemptive determination that because the FAA 
preempts state law on arbitration proceedings, class arbitration waivers can-
not be held unconscionable per se by state courts under state law.96 
 
 87. Id. at 463. 
 88. Id. at 468 (“No one denies that lower courts must follow this Court’s holding 
in Concepcion.  The fact that Concepcion was a closely divided case, resulting in a 
decision from which four Justices dissented, has no bearing on that undisputed obliga-
tion.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 469. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally id. 
 93. See Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492–96 (Mo. 2012) (en 
banc); Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 128 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 330, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 94. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 358 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 339–41 (majority opinion). 
 96. See generally id. 
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C.  Congressional Efforts to Prohibit Class Action Waivers 
Recognizing the difficulty state courts will have in preventing class ac-
tion waiver agreements after Concepcion, members of Congress recently 
attempted to enact legislation that would prohibit class action waiver clauses 
in consumer contracts of adhesion.97  The Restoring Statutory Rights and 
Interests of the States Act of 2016 was proposed in order to protect parties 
with inferior bargaining power in consumer contracts of adhesion.98  Section 
2 of the bill states: 
Recent court decisions, including AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion[,] . . . 
have interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to broadly preempt rights 
and remedies established under substantive State and Federal law.  As 
a result, these decisions have enabled business entities to avoid or 
nullify legal duties created by congressional enactment, resulting in 
millions of people in the United States being unable to vindicate their 
rights in State and Federal courts.99 
In an effort to remedy the problem described in the above quote, the bill 
seeks to amend the FAA, in part, by allowing a finding of unconscionability 
regarding arbitration agreement provisions in both federal and state court – 
this would include class arbitration waiver clauses.100  If enacted, this bill will 
effectively bar any class arbitration waiver clause determined to be uncon-
scionable, regardless of the rest of the agreement.101  In essence, it would 
prevent businesses from using class arbitration clauses to escape liability 
from the improper charging of consumers.102 
Current, Concepcion continues to prevent unconscionability arguments 
relating to the class arbitration waiver provision itself.103  However, due to 
compelling policy considerations, courts around the country, members of 
Congress, and regulatory agencies are making efforts to address this issue.104 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
This Part takes an in-depth look at issues regarding class arbitration re-
strictions and discusses possible alternative solutions to what is now an evi-
dent problem in the area of consumer contracts.  Additionally, it looks at the  
 97. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act, S. 2506, 114th 
Cong. (2016). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. § 2(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. § 3(a)(2). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. § 2(b)(2). 
 103. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
 104. See generally Note, Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act: The NLRB’s 
Determination of Substantive Statutory Rights, 128 HARV. L. REV. 907 (2015). 
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ways the changing political landscape may impact policymaking on this is-
sue. 
A.  Federal Preemption over State Contract Law 
The central issue regarding class arbitration waivers is one involving 
contract law – the doctrine of unconscionability.105  A contractual provision is 
unconscionable when it is so inequitable that no ordinary, informed person 
would agree to it.106  This doctrine is governed by state law – with each state 
free to determine precisely what is considered unconscionable.107  However, 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, when a state law 
conflicts with a federal law, the federal law preempts the state law.108  Thus, 
the issue in the case of a class arbitration waiver is whether its potential un-
conscionability is consistent with the FAA.109  To the extent that prohibiting 
class arbitration waivers through unconscionability is inconsistent with the 
FAA, federal law will preempt these state proscriptions.110  Concepcion ad-
dressed this issue of preserving the original intent of the legislature by ensur-
ing that no state law conflicts with the purposes of the FAA.111 
Specifically, the Supreme Court cited § 2 of the FAA, which states: an 
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.”112  This means that if a contract is invalid from the outset, the provi-
sions within the contract are unenforceable.113  Section 2 of the FAA seeks to 
protect arbitration provisions as much as other provisions within the con-
tract.114  Therefore, arbitration provisions, as well as any other contract provi-
sions, should be subject to the same restrictions that generally apply under 
state contract law – this is the precise intent of the FAA.115 
With this in mind, California’s Discover Bank rule sought to preserve 
the original intent of Congress but tailored its unconscionability doctrine to 
apply to instances of class arbitration waivers.116  The only way to do so was 
to narrowly circumscribe the context in which a class arbitration waiver 
 
 105. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340. 
 106. Unconscionable, LAW.COM, 
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2183 (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 107. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 109. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 343. 
 112. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974). 
 115. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 116. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109–10 (Cal. 2005), ab-
rogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333. 
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clause would be unconscionable pursuant to California state law.117  Accord-
ingly, the Discover Bank opinion articulated the parameters for a finding of 
unconscionability.118 
According to the Discover Bank rule, unconscionability will occur (1) 
when the waiver “is found in a consumer contract of adhesion,” (2) in an in-
stance where “disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve 
small amounts of damages,”  (3) “when it is alleged that the party with the 
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,” and (4) 
when the waiver becomes an exemption of the party’s responsibility for its 
fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another.119  These rules 
preserved the intent of the FAA, because they do not weaken the strength of 
the arbitration provision.120  They merely applied a general law of contracts to 
the unique principle of class arbitration waivers.121 
Further, as Justice Breyer noted in his Concepcion dissent, “[I]nsofar as 
we seek to implement Congress’ intent, we should think more than twice 
before invalidating a state law that does just what § 2 requires, namely, puts 
agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate upon the same footing.”122  
This is because there is no language in the Discover Bank rule that provides 
for a different treatment of class arbitration waivers than other class action 
waivers.123  There is simply no direct violation of the FAA in California’s 
Discover Bank rule.  While claiming that it was preserving the original intent 
of Congress, in reality, the majority in Concepcion made a judgment call and 
inserted its own policy preferences regarding class arbitration waiver claus-
es.124  Ultimately, this issue has significant public policy ramifications, and 
judicial interpretations of the FAA have inevitably been skewed based on the 
ideological beliefs underlying each side’s policy preferences. 
B.  Public Policy Regarding Class Arbitration Waiver Provisions 
Concepcion drastically altered the legal landscape of arbitration clauses 
– particularly in the area of consumer contracts of adhesion.125  The decision 
is considered a favorable ruling for businesses, as it allows them to negotiate 
with the luxury of knowing they will not be subject to class action litigation 
 
 117. See id. at 1112. 
 118. Id. at 1109–10. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 122. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 365. 
 125. Jonathon L. Serafini, Note, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving Uncon-
scionability After AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 188–
89 (2012). 
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as long as they include a class arbitration waiver provision.126  Regarding the 
enforceability of the waivers, compelling policy arguments can be provided 
for both sides. 
1.  Arguments for Class Arbitration Waivers 
There are several reasons to allow companies to include these waivers in 
their contracts of adhesion with consumers.  One of the most compelling rea-
sons is that individual arbitrators themselves are, in many instances, hardly 
qualified to make a determination regarding certification of a class of plain-
tiffs.127  Rule 23 of the FRCP guides courts in the creation of a standard fed-
eral class action lawsuit.128  The plaintiffs must meet multiple requirements 
for the court to grant certification.129  As such, courts have practical 
knowledge and expertise regarding class certification requirements, and they 
are more capable of making a sound judgment on the issue than arbitrators – 
many of whom have non-legal backgrounds. 
Although the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations closely mirror 
those of the FRCP regarding the certification requirements,130 individual arbi-
trators will have little guidance in applying these rules, and they will likely be 
more inclined to decide certification based on policy judgments rather than 
the text of the rules.131  To that effect, arbitrators would run the risk of violat-
ing the due process rights of third-party class members through issuing bind-
ing decisions regarding class certification, and it is “odd to think that an arbi-
trator would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due process rights 
are satisfied.”132  Sound procedural judgment is important in protecting po-
tential third-party class members and defendants, and a court seems more 
competent to make complex procedural determinations than arbitrators. 
Moreover, in protecting defendants, the informal process of arbitration 
leaves defendants less of an opportunity for review of errors made when com-
ing to a decision.133  The majority in Concepcion states: 
Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these errors in arbitration, 
since their impact is limited to the size of individual disputes, and pre-
 
 126. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html?_r=0. 
 127. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349; see also Liptak, supra note 126. 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Compare Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations 
(2011), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/
dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf, with id. 
 131. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347–48. 
 132. Id. at 349–50. 
 133. Id. at 350. 
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sumably outweighed by savings from avoiding the courts.  But when 
damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants 
are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often be-
come unacceptable.  Faced with even a small chance of a devastating 
loss, defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.134 
The majority held that due to the informality and lack of review, “arbi-
tration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”135  The burden 
placed on the defendant by the potential of a class arbitration is cause for 
concern.  However, there are also a multitude of counter arguments against 
class arbitration waiver provisions. 
2.  Arguments Against Class Arbitration Waivers 
It is true that class arbitration places a burden on the defendant in the 
sense that it creates potential liability on a much greater scale.136  However, 
class action litigation does this as well.137  A defendant should necessarily be 
exposed to liability for whatever harm it causes – regardless of the scope of 
that harm.  If it is expediency and efficiency that the company issuing the 
contract of adhesion prefers, then it should include an arbitration provision.138  
However, if it wants to ensure the most equitable process of review, it should 
not include such an arbitration provision.139  The issuing company must 
choose between these two options based on its preferences – it should not be 
able to have it both ways. 
In a post-Concepcion world, the company issuing an adhesion contract 
with a class arbitration waiver provision does have it both ways.  Not only are 
consumers forced to arbitrate individually any disputes arising out of the con-
tract, but they are also unable to bring a class action.140  Effectively, this 
means consumers’ only option is to arbitrate their claims on an individual 
basis.141  When only small amounts of money are involved, claimants have no 
incentive to bring a claim, as it would often be more costly to go through the 
arbitration process than it would be to simply accept the harm.142  Thus, “the 
realistic alternative to a class action is not [millions of] individual suits, but 
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues” for such a small 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Miriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total De-
mise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 386 (2005). 
 138. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974). 
 139. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350. 
 140. Id. at 352. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub 
nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
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amount of money.143  With full knowledge of this tendency of consumers, 
companies are free to tack on as many small fees to their products and ser-
vices as they want, knowing that the consumers simply will not make a claim, 
because it is not in their rational best interest to do so.144 
This is the central problem with allowing companies with superior bar-
gaining power to impose class arbitration waiver clauses in contracts of adhe-
sion.  There is no way to hold companies accountable without an appropriate 
and effective means to remedy individually small, but collectively large, 
amounts of consumer harm.145  A contractual provision with such a ramifica-
tion is unconscionable.146 
C.  Missouri and California Attempt to Protect Parties with Weaker 
Bargaining Power 
As mentioned previously, Missouri’s response to Concepcion came with 
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding in Brewer.147  The court offered a 
variety of distinguishing characteristics between the facts in Brewer and Con-
cepcion.148  The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that since its uncon-
scionability laws were different from California’s, it was free to make a de-
termination regarding the validity of the contract as a whole – including its 
class arbitration waiver provision – and whether it was unconscionable.149  
Thus, while the Supreme Court of Missouri is still bound by the Concepcion 
holding, it will only be bound to a finding of contractual validity in instances 
similar to Concepcion. 
However, facts similar to those in Concepcion are becoming increasing-
ly prevalent, and courts in Missouri are having a difficult time distinguishing 
each case from Concepcion.150  In light of the Brewer holding, the plaintiff in 
Davis v. Sprint Nextel Corp. sought to bring a class action claim against 
Sprint after being charged improper late fees.151  The contract included a class 
action waiver provision.152  In this case, the court held that the facts were not 
sufficiently different from Concepcion to find the contract unconscionable.153  
In reaching its decision, the court recognized Brewer but conceded that its 
 
 143. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 365–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 146. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109–10 (Cal. 2005), ab-
rogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333. 
 147. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 148. See id. at 492–96. 
 149. Id. at 496. 
 150. Davis v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 12-01023-CV-W-DW, 2012 WL 5904327, 
at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 26, 2012). 
 151. Id. at *1. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at *5. 
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application was limited to contracts that were unconscionable as a whole.154  
The court was unable to find general unconscionability in the contract and 
was therefore bound by the holding in Concepcion.155 
Thus, while Missouri has made efforts to protect the consumer through 
findings of contractual unconscionability, the scope of the protection is lim-
ited.  Concepcion’s application has proven broad – precluding any uncon-
scionability defense regarding the class arbitration waiver provision itself.156 
The DIRECTV case was another example of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia’s strong effort to protect consumers by preventing companies with 
superior bargaining power from taking advantage of contractual loopholes.157  
When the arbitration agreement provided that the entire arbitration clause was 
not enforceable if the “law of your state” declared class arbitration waivers 
unenforceable, the Supreme Court of California held that ambiguities with 
phraseology should be construed against the drafter, not the consumer.158  
However, the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed this notion and 
simply held that “the law of your state” means valid state law not preempted 
by federal law.159  On this most recent occasion, and many others preceding 
it, the Supreme Court continues to hand down favorable rulings for powerful 
companies with superior bargaining power that issue contracts of adhesion.160  
As time passes, more and more companies are using these waivers to escape 
the just consequences of charging customers improper fees.161  Fortunately, 
as more people realize what is happening with these waivers in practice, there 
is growing pressure for change. 
D.  Potential Legislation and the Future of Class Arbitration Waiver 
Clauses 
Many governmental agencies have protested the use of class arbitration 
waiver clauses, as well as arbitration clauses in general.162  The Director of 
the CFPB, Richard Cordray, stated in a recent speech: “Companies should not 
be able to place themselves above the law and evade public accountability 
simply by inserting the magic word ‘arbitration’ in a document and dictating 
 
 154. Id. at *3. 
 155. Id. at *5. 
 156. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 157. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 195 (Cal. 2014), rev’d, 
136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 158. Id. at 196. 
 159. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468. 
 160. Id. at 463. 
 161. See id. at 477; see also Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339; Davis v. Sprint Nextel 
Corp., No. 12-01023-CV-W-DW, 2012 WL 5904327, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 26, 
2012). 
 162. David Lazarus, Government May Soon Begin Putting an End to Forced Arbi-
tration Clauses, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
lazarus-20160226-column.html. 
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the favorable consequences.”163  He continued, “Consumers should be able to 
join together to assert and vindicate their established legal rights.”164  
Cordray’s thoughts seem to mirror those of some in Congress, as indicated by 
recent legislative action regarding arbitration clauses, as there has been recent 
proposed legislation regarding arbitration.165 
While it is unlikely that Congress would entertain arbitration agreement 
reform legislation any time soon,166 it may consider the recently proposed 
bill, which “would forbid companies from making customers waive their 
right to sue or join a class-action lawsuit.”167  Vermont Senator Patrick 
Leahy, speaking in favor of the bill, said, “[A]rbitration should not be forced 
upon consumers and workers through take-it-or-leave-it contracts they have 
no real choice but to accept.”168  A contract requiring a waiver of the ability 
to bring a class action is contrary to sound public policy.169 
Not surprisingly, this issue is very polarizing and creates a pronounced 
split across ideological lines.170  The likelihood of reaching a solution via the 
Supreme Court or Congress depends greatly on the ideological balance of 
these institutions.171  Over the past several years, conservative majorities in 
both the Supreme Court and Congress have been hesitant to prohibit class 
action waivers for reasons outlined by the majority in Concepcion regarding 
the right to contract freely.172  In Congress, all parties should agree that com-
panies engaging in illegal activity to cheat consumers out of amounts totaling 
billions of dollars is intolerable.  Members of Congress will likely need to 
reach across party lines and work together to come up with a solution.  
E.  Potential Regulatory Agency Action 
If the Supreme Court and Congress do not solve the inherent problems 
arising from class action waivers in contracts of adhesion, regulatory agencies 
such as the CFPB may intercede.173  In May of 2016, the CFPB proposed a 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id.  Over the last several years, Congress has been “business friendly” 
and reluctant to enact legislation that is favorable to the consumer and contrary to the 
interests of businesses.  Id. 
 167. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act, S. 2506, 114th 
Cong. (2016); Lazarus, supra note 162. 
 168. Lazarus, supra note 162. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–47 (2011).   
 173. CFPB Press Release, supra note 12; see also George Calhoun, Arbitration 
Under Fire: Brace Your Company for Less Contract Freedom and More Class Ac-
tions, FTC BEAT (Mar. 31, 2016), http://ftcbeat.com/2016/03/31/arbitration-under-
fire-brace-your-company-for-less-contract-freedom-and-more-class-actions/. 
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/16
2016] CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 1169 
rule that would prohibit consumer financial companies from including arbi-
tration clauses to prevent consumers from suing in large numbers.174  In ex-
plaining the reasoning behind the proposal, Richard Cordray stated: 
Signing up for a credit card or opening a bank account can often mean 
signing away your right to take the company to court if things go 
wrong . . . . Many banks and financial companies avoid accountability 
by putting arbitration clauses in their contracts that block groups of 
their customers from suing them.  Our proposal seeks comment on 
whether to ban this contract gotcha that effectively denies groups of 
consumers the right to seek justice and relief for wrongdoing.175 
To support the idea of creating rules protecting consumers from class 
action waiver clauses, the CFPB conducted a study.176  According to the re-
sults of the study, three quarters of consumers surveyed in the credit card 
industry did not realize they were subject to arbitration pursuant to the terms 
of their agreements.177  Fewer than 7 percent of consumers in the credit card 
industry understood that their contracts limited their ability to sue in court – 
including their ability to join in a class action lawsuit.178  In a previous survey 
of consumers from a variety of industries, only 2 percent said they would hire 
an attorney and pursue a claim for small-dollar amounts.179  This confirms the 
notion that most consumers simply will not bring an individual claim for a 
small amount of damages – effectively allowing companies to use class ac-
tion waivers to escape liability for wrongdoing.180 
With the understanding that legislation is unlikely to bring an end to this 
problem, the CFPB is actively discussing creating a set of rules that would 
ban the use of class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion.181  
Given the current political climate, the best chance for eliminating this prob-
lem would be through rules created by regulatory agencies such as the 
CFPB.182  Specifically, a rule that would prohibit a company’s use of class 
action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion would solve the problem.183  
Of course, these regulations would be subject to challenges and modifications 
 
 174. CFPB Press Release, supra note 12. 
 175. Id. 
 176. CFPB, REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) (Mar. 2015) [hereinafter CFPB 
REPORT], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-
congress-2015.pdf; CFPB Press Release, supra note 12. 
 177. CFPB REPORT, supra note 176, § 3 p.22; see also CFPB Press Release, supra 
note 12. 
 178. CFPB REPORT, supra note 176, § 3 p.19. 
 179. CFPB Press Release, supra note 12. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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through judicial decision-making and legislation, but given the deference 
usually afforded to regulatory agencies, such challenges would be unlikely to 
have much material impact.184 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As is often the case when issuing decisions, courts must consider the 
policy implications of their rulings.  For matters involving class arbitration 
waiver agreements in contracts of adhesion, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has adopted a broad interpretation of § 2 of the FAA.185  As such, it has 
held that the FAA will preempt any finding of unconscionability relating 
solely to the class arbitration waiver provision pursuant to state contract 
law.186  This holding allows companies with superior bargaining power to 
impose individually small fees at will, with the knowledge that consumers 
will choose not to pursue a claim for such a small amount.187 
In an effort to avoid this problem, Missouri courts, as well as courts 
around the country, have attempted to find ways around the Concepcion hold-
ing.188  For the most part, these efforts have been ineffective, and even those 
that have been successful have had a narrow application.189  Until the Su-
preme Court chooses to address this problem, courts will be stuck issuing 
unfavorable judgments toward consumers, and companies will continue to 
not be held responsible for the millions of dollars of damages they cause 
through the accumulation of small fees.  If the Supreme Court continues to 
interpret the FAA in such a broad, preemptive manner and fails to address the 
policy considerations, legislation may bring about reform by preventing the 
contracting party from including a class action waiver clause in a contract of 
adhesion.190  This would allow courts to preserve Congress’s original intent 
in creating the FAA while preventing this problem.  The probability of such 
legislation becoming law depends on the willingness of Congress to work 
together in a bipartisan manner to solve this problem. 
If Congress and the Supreme Court fail to bring about change that 
would prevent consumer financial companies from escaping liability through 
consumer contracts of adhesion that include class action waiver clauses, regu-
latory agencies such as the CFPB should promulgate regulations that will 
prohibit the use of such class action waivers.191  In fact, the CFPB has already 
proposed a rule to eliminate class action waivers.192  Regulatory action is the 
 
 184. Calhoun, supra note 173. 
 185. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339–40 (2011). 
 186. Id. at 352. 
 187. CFPB Press Release, supra note 12. 
 188. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 189. See id. at 495. 
 190. Lazarus, supra note 162. 
 191. CFPB Press Release, supra note 12. 
 192. Id. 
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most practical and feasible solution to this problem given the partisan nature 
of the issue and the ideological balance of both the Supreme Court and Con-
gress. 
Regardless of how the solution is reached, something must be done to 
remedy this problem.  At the moment, consumers are left with no practical 
recourse, while companies charge fee after fee, in breach of their contracts, 
with no fear of being held accountable.193  As it stands now, not only are 
companies wrongly gaining billions of dollars at the expense of the general 
public, but effectively, consumers are also stripped of their ability to seek 
redress for their injuries. 
   
 
 193. Id. 
21
Downing: An Important Time
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1172 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/16
